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Abstract In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed
over both humans and technological artefacts’, recently proposed by Peter-Paul
Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We
argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part
of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a
moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological
artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers of instrumental value.
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Introduction
On March 29, 2010, 39 people were killed in a suicide attack in the Moscow metro.
According to the Russian police, ‘two female suicide bombers from north Caucasus
have been identiﬁed’, one of which is 17 year old Dzjennet Abdarchmanova.
1
Despite her youth she was already a widow. Her husband was shot dead by the
Russian army on New Year’s Eve 2009.
Although various groups are likely to disagree about who is ultimately responsible
for the attack in the Moscow metro, most laypeople would presumably concede that
the bomb itself was not a moral agent that could be held responsible. Common sense
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DOI 10.1007/s11948-010-9241-3suggests that Mrs Abdarchmanova was at least partly responsible for the attack
herself; and some responsibility should perhaps also be assigned to people in
Caucasuswhohelpedhertocarryouttheattack.Asmallnumberofpeoplemighteven
be willing to attribute some moral responsibility to Alfred Nobel, the inventor of the
chemical substance used in many bombs. However, to assign moral responsibility to
technological artefacts, such as bombs and weapons, would be absurd.
Surprisingly, a signiﬁcant number of scholars working on the ethics of
technology disagree with this picture. Some of them believe that, ‘moral agency
is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’.
2 This is no doubt a
radical claim. At ﬁrst glance, it is not easy to see why we should accept it. However,
according Peter-Paul Verbeek, an important argument is that ‘humans and
technologies do not have a separate existence anymore’.
3 His point seems to be
that moral agency is distributed over (some) technological artefacts because the
technological artefacts and humans form—in some sense that remains to be
speciﬁed—a close unity in which humans and the technological artefact can no
longer be separated. This is a challenging idea.
In this article we scrutinise the recent debate over the moral status of
technological artefacts. Can they be moral agents? Or can technological artefacts
be morally relevant in some weaker sense? Our aim is twofold. First, we aim to
clarify the main arguments in the debate by stating them in ways that everyone can
understand. This is not a trivial task. Some of the arguments were originally
formulated by scholars coming from a tradition in which the divide between
analytic and continental philosophy seems to make cross-boundary communication
very difﬁcult. Our second aim is to evaluate the arguments and adjudicate which
arguments, if any, we ought to accept.
To begin with, it is helpful to distinguish between two different views about the
moral status of technological artefacts, viz. the Strong and the Moderate Views.
Advocates of the Strong View believe that both humans and technological artefacts
can be moral agents, and that one is therefore justiﬁed in concluding that
‘technologies embody morality’.
4 So on this view, it does indeed make sense to give
a very prominent role to technological artefacts in ethics. In contrast to the Strong
View, the Moderate View does not entail that technological artefacts are, or can be a
part of, a moral agent. However, scholars defending this view nevertheless believe
that the role of (some) technological artefacts is quite different from that of other
artefacts. In this article we will focus in particular on a version of the Moderate
View recently defended by Christian Illies and Anthonie Meijers.
The upshot of this paper is a defence of a view that we take to be an attractive
alternative to the Strong and Moderate views. We call this new view the Weak
Neutrality Thesis. It holds that technological artefacts sometimes affect the moral
evaluation of actions, although these artefacts never ﬁgure as moral agents or are
morally responsible for their effects. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the
2 Verbeek (2008, p. 24). Our discussion of Verbeek’s views is based on his 2005, 2006, and 2008. We are
aware that other philosophers have also defended similar ideas.
3 Verbeek (2008, p. 14).
4 Ibid., p. 11.
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123ﬁrst section, ‘‘The Strong View’’, we present and evaluate Verbeek’s defence of the
Strong View. In the second section, ‘‘The Moderate View’’, we present and evaluate
the Moderate View as it has been defended by Illies and Meijers. Finally, in the last
section, ‘‘The Weak Neutrality Thesis’’, we present and defend our own view, the
Weak Neutrality Thesis. We argue that our view avoids the weaknesses of the
Strong and Moderate views, without loosing any explanatory power or other
theoretical virtues.
The Strong View
Verbeek’s account of the Strong View consists of four separate claims. He
formulates the four claims as follows:
(1) ‘technological artefacts … actively co-shape people’s being in the world’
5
(2) ‘humans and technologies do not have a separate existence any more’
6
(3) ‘technologies … have an intentionality’
7
————————————————————————————————
(4) ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’
8
Although Verbeek is never explicit about the argumentative role of these claims,
it is reasonable to assume that (1)–(3) are premises intended to support the
conclusion (4). This means that if Verbeek is right, we should believe (4) because of
(1)–(3). Moreover, it also seems that Verbeek takes some of the premises to support
each other; in particular, it seems that (3) is meant to support (2).
Whether Verbeek’sconclusion(4)reallyfollows from(1)–(3)seemstobeamatter
of deﬁnitions. If all entities that have intentions are moral agents, then the argument
wouldbevalid.However,ifintentionalityisallthatisrequiredforbeingamoralagent
then (1) and (2) would be superﬂuous in the argument. This indicates that this is
probably not the notion of moral agency Verbeek has in mind. It also seems that (2)
could support (4) on its own. If we assume that humans are moral agents, and that
humans and technologies ‘do not have a separate existence any more’, then it follows
that moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts. The
problem with this interpretation is, again, that it makes the role of the other premises
difﬁcult to understand. Arguably, the best way to assess the argument is to analyse
each of its premises in turn, and then discuss what follows from them.
Premise (1) is called ‘mediation’. The key idea is that technological artefacts are
not neutral intermediaries; since artefacts affect humans in so many different ways
5 Verbeek (2006, p. 364). See also his 2008, p. 14 and 2005, pp. 154–161.
6 Ibid. See also his 2005, p. 164.
7 Verbeek (2005, p. 115). Verbeek (2008, p. 14), claims that, ‘in many cases ‘‘intentionality’’ needs to be
located in human-technology associations—and therefore partly in artifacts’.
8 Verbeek (2008, p. 24). In his earlier writings, Verbeek position is less clear: ‘Things do not have
intentions and cannot be held responsible for what they do. But    things have a moral valence    Things
carry morality because they shape the way in which people experience their world’ (Verbeek 2005,
p. 216).
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experience and existence.’
9 The technological mediation of perception is said to
always work through the mechanisms of ‘ampliﬁcation’ and ‘reduction’. Consider
for instance a thermal camera. This camera ‘ampliﬁes’ certain aspects of reality
while other aspects are ‘reduced’. With the help of such a camera one may thus see
e.g. losses of energy at the siding of a house, but there are also other aspects one
could only have seen with one’s naked eye, such as the true colour of the front door.
Note, however, that it would be incorrect to say that the thermal camera changes
reality; it just changes our perception of it.
Verbeek maintains that many actions are actively ‘co-shaped’ by the environ-
ment. Revolving doors were originally designed with the intention of keeping the
wind out but had the mediating side-effect that people in wheel-chairs could no
longer enter buildings through such doors. Verbeek argues that because technol-
ogies often have these kinds of mediating effects, the ethics of technology should
not be technophobic, contrary to what was suggested by e.g. Heidegger or
Habermas. On Verbeek’s view, we should accept the fact that mediation is always
going on and adjust our actions accordingly.
We disagree with Verbeek about premise (1). In our view, there is no reason to
think that his examples of mediation support the claim he takes them to support. It is
simply not true that thermal cameras and revolving doors show that ‘technological
artefacts … actively co-shape people’s being’.
10 It is of course correct that the use
of technologies often have important effects on us, and it may very well be true that
it is impossible or very difﬁcult to foresee those effects. However, this does not
mean that technologies ‘actively co-shape people’s being’.
11 Technologies are not
active in any reasonable sense. They are passive. The entity that is active is the
designer or inventor who decides to produce or sell the new artefacts. This is not to
deny that technologies have an impact on people’s being. Our point is just that the
claim that they ‘actively co-shape’ our being is misleading. Technological objects
certainly have an impact on us and our actions, like many other natural and non-
natural objects, but this impact is not active in the sense that it is independent of the
designer or inventor who decides to produce or sell the new artefacts.
This brings us to premise (2) of Verbeek’s argument. Its main point is supposed
to be that humans and technologies ‘do not have a separate existence any more’.
12
On a straightforward reading of this claim, it seems to be false. Many technologies,
such as sun-powered satellites, would continue to exist for decades even if all
humans were to suddenly go extinct. This suggest that satellites and humans do in
fact ‘have a separate existence’, according to a literal reading of that claim. We take
this to show that this is not what Verbeek seeks to claim.
9 Verbeek (2006, p. 364). Verbeek (2008, p. 14), writes that,’we cannot hold on to the autonomy of the
human subject as a prerequisite for moral agency … we need to replace the ‘‘prime mover’’ status of the
human subject with technologically mediated intentions.’
10 Verbeek (2006, p 364).
11 Op. cit., our italics.
12 Verbeek (2008, p. 14).
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more sophisticated but less straightforward way. Here is a possible interpretation
(which is not discussed by Verbeek) that would make the premise true: A
technology is not just a material object, it also comprises knowledge about how the
objects is constructed and used. Take, for instance, the solar-powered satellite. It
seems very plausible to maintain that if all humans were to suddenly go extinct,
there would no longer be anyone around who knew how to operate and maintain the
satellite. Hence, there is a sense in which humans and satellites are intertwined:
Knowledge about the construction and functioning of the technological artefact is
stored in human brains. So if all humans were to go extinct, all this knowledge
would no longer exist, and in that sense there would no longer be any satellite
technology. The problem with this interpretation is that it is too broad. If all that is
required for humans and technologies not to have ‘separate existence’ is that the
former have knowledge about the latter, it would follow that e.g. humans and the
weather, or humans and the planet Saturn do not have ‘separate existence’. If all
humans were to suddenly go extinct, all our knowledge about how to predict,
explain and respond to good and bad weather (which seems to affect our life as
much as technologies) would be lost. The same would be true of our knowledge
about the planet Saturn. This indicates that this interpretation of (2), although easy
to understand, is of limited interest.
We now come to what we take to be the most promising interpretation of (2).
According to this interpretation, the mediating role of technology blurs the
ontological distinction between ‘subject’ and ‘object’. In traditional Cartesian
ontologies the subject is taken to be active, and can have intentions and agency,
whereas the object is passive and can neither have agency nor intentionality. We
believe that this is the distinction that Verbeek wishes to question.
On this reading of (2), Verbeek thus seeks to show how modern technologies
cannot be adequately interpreted by using Descartes’ traditional categories. We
have already explained that Verbeek believes that technologies mediate our
interpretation of reality, and it is thus not unreasonable to suppose that this
mediating role of technology helps to constitute what counts as ‘object’ and
‘subject’ in our society. However, the problem with this interpretation of (2) is that
it makes the argument for ascribing moral agency to artefacts extremely dependent
on a substantial ontological assumption. Ideally, a good argument for ascribing
moral agency to artefacts should be compatible with a wide range of basic
ontological assumptions. Veerbeek’s argument does not meet this desideratum. For
example, we take it that a large number of philosophers would agree with us that
Verbeek’s argument blurs the fundamental distinction between our perception of
reality and the way things really are. If it is possible for us to hold false beliefs about
reality, we need to distinguish between our beliefs about the world and the way
things really are. Verbeek might be right that technologies affect they way we
perceive reality, but in our view this does not prove anything about how things
really are. We are all familiar with cases in which our perception of reality gets
blurred, such as when we drink massive amounts of alcohol. Such cases might be
interesting from a psychological or epistemic point of view, but their ontological
signiﬁcance is negligible.
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ultrasound scans are not mere tools for making ‘visible an unborn child in the
womb’.
13 Technologies that mediate our experience of the world do not provide a
neutral picture of the object in question. According to Verbeek, these technologies
rather (i) constitute what counts as reality, or at least (ii) which aspects of reality
count as being relevant. Interpretation (ii) is of course much weaker than (i), and can
hardly be taken to support (2). We therefore focus on (i). According to Verbeek, an
ultrasound represents the foetus in a very speciﬁc way: as a potential patient and as a
person with moral status. It thus generates ‘a new ontological status of the foetus’.
14
What counts as an object can be altered by technologies. If true, we agree that this
would support (2).
Verbeek moreover claims that ‘subjectivity’ is also mediated through technology.
In his defence of this claim he refers to Foucault’s analysis of the ‘subject’ in his
History of Sexuality.
15 Foucault’s main idea is that the (moral) subject is not time-
independent, in the sense that each temporal period and each ethical system seems
to have its own idea about what counts as subject and what constitutes a subject.
‘Ethics is done by ‘subjecting’ oneself to a speciﬁc ethical code, and by doing so
people constitute themselves as speciﬁc moral subjects’.
16 In our time, technology
plays a very important role for the way in which the subject constitutes herself.
Technology thus becomes relevant for ethics because of the way technology
constitutes the subject. We take Verbeek to claim that this line of thought offers
additional support for (2).
In our view, neither of the two lines of reasoning outlined above support (2). The
claim that technology constitutes the object (because what counts as object is altered
by technology) as well as the claim that technology constitutes the subject (because
what counts as subject is also altered by technology) are problematic. These claims
confuse the distinction between the genesis of our ideas, i.e. claims about how we
do actually reach moral and epistemic judgements, and the justiﬁcation of these
claims. Verbeek’s argument can at best show that our beliefs, opinions, and moral
judgments may depend to some extent on what technologies are available in society.
However, this does not lend support to the ontological claim that, ‘Humans and
technologies do not have a separate existence any more’. Our beliefs, opinions, and
moral judgments also seem to depend partly on what beliefs, opinions, and moral
judgments are expressed by the Pope in Rome (For some people there might be a
positive correlation, for others a negative one). Fortunately, the fact that our beliefs,
opinions, and moral judgments depend partly on what the Pope says does not prove
that the Pope and we, ‘do not have a separate existence any more’.
17
The least plausible of Verbeek’s premises is that technologies have intentionality,
i.e. premise (3). We of course agree that if Verbeek could really show that
technologies have intentionality, this would indeed lend support to the claim that
13 Verbeek (2008, p. 14).
14 Ibid. p. 16.
15 See Foucault (1976–84).
16 Ibid. p. 18.
17 Op.cit.
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We also acknowledge that the argument Verbeek gives for thinking that
technologies have intentionality is true: His argument is that technologies sometime
inﬂuence people’s behaviour, e.g. by forcing people to change their behaviour or by
persuading them to choose certain actions. Verbeek mentions an example suggested
by Ihde, who points out that one writes slowly with a fountain pen. This makes it
easier to think over the sentence carefully. If one instead were to use a word
processor it would become easier to rewrite the text and alter individual words.
According to Verbeek, this shows that ‘these writing technologies … play an active
role in the relation between author and text. They have an intentionality, a trajectory
that promotes a speciﬁc kind of use’.
18 We disagree with this. Although it is true
that technologies tend to inﬂuence people’s behaviour, we do not think that one
should use the term ‘intentionality’ to characterize this inﬂuence. Consider, for
instance, a man-made path through a valley in the Alps. One could of course say
that the path has a ‘trajectory’ and ‘promotes a speciﬁc kind of use’, but it would be
a mistake to take this to show that the path can have intentionality. A path is by no
means an agent that performs intentional actions. To claim otherwise would be a
deeply misleading use of philosophical terminology.
Verbeek rightly emphasises that the function of a technological artefact cannot
always be traced back to the intentions of the designer. The function of a
technological artefact can change over time and it can be used for different purposes
in different contexts. This does not entail that there is any intentionality within the
artefact, however. The telephone was originally invented and designed for the hard-
of-hearing.
19 That it is nowadays being used for a different purpose does not prove
much. In order to explain the change of function, no technological intentionality or
joint human-artefact-intentionality is needed. All that needs to be said is to simply
point out that technological artefacts may be used for different purposes in different
situations. This does not mean that they have intentions of their own. We should
therefore reject premise (3).
We conclude that Verbeek’s defence of the Strong View seems to be based on
false premises. Premises (1)–(3) are very implausible assumptions, which we have
no reason to accept. Verbeek’s attempt to justify the conclusion (4) is therefore not
convincing.
The Moderate View
Illies and Meijers defend what we call the Moderate View. They describe the
Moderate View as, ‘an intermediate position that attributes moral relevance to
artefacts without making them morally responsible or morally accountable for their
effects’.
20 Illies and Meijers never deﬁne their notion of moral relevance (and they
sometimes use the term ‘moral signiﬁcance’ instead of ‘moral relevance’ without
18 Verbeek (2005, p. 115). See also Ihde (1990, pp. 140–143).
19 Black (1997, p. 18).
20 Illies and Meijers (2009, p. 437).
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notion of moral relevance they have in mind needs to be a quite strong one, that
goes beyond the observation that technological artefacts sometimes affect the
outcome of our actions. Otherwise the Moderate View would simply collapse into
the uncontroversial claim that technological artefacts sometimes play a causal role
in a chain of events in roughly the same way as e.g. storms, volcanoes, and other
natural phenomena.
In order to correctly understand the Moderate View it is paramount to note that it
is not a claim about the moral relevance of individual actions, but a claim about
what Illies and Meijers call Action Schemes. An Action Scheme is deﬁned as, ‘the
set of possible actions with different attractiveness that is available to an agent or
group of agents in a given situation’.
21 So rather than focussing on how artefacts
affect individual actions, Illies and Meijers focus on how artefacts affect the set of
actions available to the agent. Their key point is that technological artefacts are
morally relevant in the sense that they sometimes affect the attractiveness of the
possible actions that make up an Action Scheme. Note that this notion of moral
relevance is a rather weak one. In light of our remark above, it may actually be too
weak: Virtually all kinds of entities, including cars, ﬂowers and volcanoes will
sometimes affect your options for actions; hence, everyone would certainly have to
admit that technological artefacts are morally relevant. We suspect that this is not
the notion of moral relevance Illies and Meijers have in mind.
As explained by Illies and Meijers, ‘the introduction of the mobile phone has
extended our range of possible communicative actions’.
22 A mobile phone is thus
morally relevant in the sense that it affects what alternative actions are available to
us. This point can also be spelled out by talking about reasons. By introducing new
actions people get new reasons for action that they did not have before. For
example, since it is nowadays easy to communicate with one’s near and dear even
from remote places in the world it could be claimed that the introduction of mobile
phones and other technologies have given us a reason to keep in touch with our
relatives that we did not have before. If things become possible, that were not
possible before, this might change our moral obligations. If we do not have a moral
obligation to do x because it is impossible for us to do x, but to do x would be
morally required if x was possible, then a change in the realm of ‘can’ implies a
change in the realm of ‘ought’. This notion of moral relevance seems to be the one
that Illies and Meijers have in mind.
We are now in a position to give a more precise account of the sense in which
Illies and Meijers take technological artefacts to be morally relevant. Consider the
following two slightly different principles for evaluating sets of actions, which we
will call S and S0, respectively:
S: ‘We might even see it as better if, ceteris paribus, people have more rather than
fewer options for actions’.
23
21 Ibid, p. 427.
22 Ibid, p. 427.
23 Ibid, p. 431.
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something morally good in S1 that they do not have in S2’.
24
Note that according to principles S and S0 the mere possibility to perform a good
action is morally relevant. By creating new possible actions one may thus turn a bad
situation into a good one. Technological artefacts are thus morally relevant in the
sense that they often create new options for actions.
25
Illies and Meijers explicitly claim that the binary relation ‘better than’ is a
relation that holds between situations, not between actions. This means that their
position cannot be conceived of as an alternative to traditional ethical theories such
as consequentialism or Kantianism. Traditional moral theories evaluate individual
actions, not situations or sets of alternatives. (Illies and Meijers however correctly
point out, but do not explore, the link between the Moderate View and the capability
approach advocated by Sen and Nussbaum.)
Should we accept the Moderate View? We think one could raise at least three
objections against it. The ﬁrst objection is a moral one. As pointed out above, the
Moderate View entails that we should assess situations (or Action Schemes) rather
than individual actions from a moral point of view. This entails that actions that are
possible to perform, but never actually performed, may sometimes affect our moral
verdicts. To take an extreme example, suppose the Nazis had invented Cyclone C in
1940. Cyclone C is, we assume, a gas that would have had caused slightly more pain
and death than Cyclone B. (The latter is the chemical substance used by the Nazis
for killing six million Jews during World War II).
Would it really have made a moral difference if the Nazis could have used
Cyclone C in addition to Cyclone B for killing six million Jews? Principle S states
that, ‘we even see it as better if, ceteris paribus, people have more rather than fewer
options for actions’. In our view, this is morally absurd. It simply makes little sense
to claim that one would have made things better by inventing Cyclone C and
thereby had given the Nazis ‘more rather than fewer options for action’.
Principle S0 is more reasonable than S, since it at least takes the moral features of
the options added to the Action Scheme into account. That said, it is nevertheless
deeply problematic to claim that one situation is morally better than another just
because people have the option to do something morally good in the ﬁrst situation
that they do not have in second. In order to see this, suppose that Cyclone C was
actually a much less harmful substance than Cyclone B (so much less harmful that
the choice between the two was of signiﬁcant moral importance). Now Illies and
Meijers are committed to the implausible claim that (i) the situation in which both
Cyclone B and Cyclone C are available but only Cyclone B is used is morally better
than (ii) the situation in which only Cyclone B is available and used. The mere
possibility to kill people in a less harmful way would thus make a moral difference
to the atrocities carried out by the Nazis. This is implausible. If both Cyclone B and
24 Ibid.
25 Note that this view presupposes a rather thick notion of action. Some people may of course doubt that
making a phone call is an action. On a minimalist account of action, one rather uses one’s ﬁngers for
pressing some buttons. On this minimalist account technological artefacts thus never make new actions
available.
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be any better than the situation in which only Cyclone B is available and used. The
fact that the Nazis had the opportunity to use a less harmful chemical, but did not
take that opportunity, either made things worse or made no moral difference. It
certainly did not make the situation better.
Similar examples can be constructed in which only positive values are at stake.
Imagine, for instance, that a group of clever engineers have invented a new
technology that would, if used, provide enormous quantities of safe and
environmentally friendly energy. Also suppose that we know for sure—never mind
how—that this technology will never be used. According to Illies and Meijers, the
introduction of this new technology was nevertheless a change for the better. They
are logically committed to the claim that actions that are never performed may make
a situation morally better. This conclusion however strikes us as implausible. For
why would the introduction of a merely possible action make a situation better?
At this point Illies and Meijers could reply that it is important to distinguish
between ﬁrst and second-order responsibilities. In their vocabulary, our ﬁrst-order
responsibility is to carry out morally right actions, but our second-order
responsibility is to make sure that there are some morally good actions to choose,
i.e. to bring about a good Action Scheme. The problem with this reply is, however,
that bringing about an Action Scheme is in itself an action. We thus have a ﬁrst-
order responsibility to bring about good Actions Schemes rather than bad ones. This
means that what appears to be a second-order responsibility is actually a ﬁrst-order
responsibility. The distinction between ﬁrst- and second-order responsibilities, to
which Illies and Meijers frequently appeal, does not seem to take care of the
objection it is designed to take care of.
26
We now turn to our second objection to the Moderate View. Illies and Meijers
explicitly claim that one should make moral appraisals of entire situations, including
Action Schemes. This seems to be a category mistake. As far as we can see, it makes
little sense to claim that one situation (or Action Scheme) could be morally better
than another, at least if ‘morally better’ is taken to mean something like, ‘has the
property of being morally preferable to’. In our view, the relevant concept to
analyse in moral inquiries is the moral status of individual actions. Consider, for
instance, consequentialism. This theory provides a clear and unambiguous answer to
the question: ‘Under what conditions is an action morally right?’. Consequentialists
claim that an action is morally right if and only if its consequences are at least as
good as those of all its alternatives, but it would make no sense to say that an
alternative action in one set of alternatives is better than some other alternative
action in some other set of alternatives. The consequences of an action are evaluated
26 Let us also mention another moral worry with the Moderate View: If we admit that technological
artefacts are somehow morally relevant in a non-causal sense, it might be tempting to blame artefacts
rather than humans for atrocities such as the Holocaust. That is, if we were to accept that bombs and
chemical substances could be held morally responsible for the death of six million people, or at least
affect the moral evaluation of a situation, there is a risk that we start paying too little attention to the
moral responsibility of humans. By including artefacts in moral discussions, we may shift the focus from
humans to artefacts in an inappropriate way. This is of course not an objection against the internal
coherence of any of the positions discussed here; it is purely pragmatic remark.
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have no meaning, nor do moral claims about entire situations or sets of alternative
actions.
A possible objection to the claim that Illies and Meijers make a category mistake
in evaluating entire Action Schemes is that similar appraisals are legion in e.g. the
literature on freedom of choice.
27 The contemporary discussion of freedom of
choice is, however, mainly concerned with evaluating how much freedom there is in
a set of actions, not its overall moral goodness. It seems perfectly coherent to claim
that freedom of choice only has moral implications in appraisals of individual
actions, but not when appraising sets of actions.
Although it is of course possible to argue that the moral categories discussed and
analysed by consequentialists (as well as many non-consequentialists, such as
Kantians) are too narrow, it remains to explain what would be gained by such a
radical departure from one of the most basic assumptions in moral philosophy.
Consequentialists (as well as many non-consequentialists, such as Kantians) can
make interesting moral evaluations of new technologies by focusing on their actual,
foreseen,o rintended effects. For them, there is no need to make moral evaluations
of entire situations or Action Schemes. Illies and Meijers fail to explain what they
believe could be achieved with their approach, that cannot be achieved with the
traditional approach.
That said, we of course admit that there is an uncontroversial sense in which
some Action Schemes might be morally better than others: By bringing about
Action Schemes comprising morally attractive options (by e.g. developing new
technologies) one makes it possible to perform those morally attractive options, and
this is of course morally praiseworthy. Note, however, that on this account the
bringing-about of an Action Scheme is a mere tool for enabling the realisation of
morally attractive actions. Many objects, such as penicillin, blood transfusions and
perhaps Action Schemes, can be valuable in this instrumental sense. However, this
is hardly sufﬁcient for showing what Illies and Meijers wish to show.
Our ontological objection could also be spelled out by appealing to a weak
version of Occam’s razor. Principles S and S0 require that entities such as sets of
actions and situations have the same moral properties as actions. A set of elements
can be very different from its element. If all the books in your library happen to be
green, it does not follow that the set of all books in your library is green. On the
contrary, it is widely agreed that sets of books have no colour at all. The property of
being green is not a property that can be reasonably ascribed to a set of books.
Therefore, by claiming that sets of actions (Action Schemes) can have moral
properties just because the elements of the set can have those properties, Illies and
Meijers implicitly commit themselves to a rather strong ontological claim: their
theory puts certain restrictions on their ontology, which may turn out to be
unnecessary. No matter what kind of entity moral goodness is, it seems clear that not
all objects can have that property. A wall cannot be morally good, nor can a prime
number or a set of green books. However, by assuming that sets of actions can be
27 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern. See e.g. Gustafsson (2010) for
an interesting measure of freedom of choice.
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ontological assumptions about what a set is. From an ontological point of view, this
seems unnecessary. Given that there is a more simple and less demanding ontology
available, according to which only individual actions can have moral properties, we
ought to prefer that ontology, every thing else being equal.
Our third objection to the Moderate View is that it is too broad. Even if we were
to accept the Moderate View, it would not give us what Illies and Meijers say and
believe it gives us. According to Illies and Meijers, ‘This analysis sheds new light
on the responsibilities that engineers, researchers, developers and the producers of
artefacts have’.
28 However, if one were to accept the controversial claim that sets of
actions, rather than individuals actions, are morally good or bad, then new
technological artefacts would be in no sense unique or different from a large number
of other entities, including natural artefacts. Imagine, for instance, that you are
planning to sail from Syracuse to Athens. Because of the work of a group of clever
engineers it is now possible to do this trip in a carbon ﬁbre 40 ft sailing yacht with
North 3DL laminated sails, which will enable you to cover the distance faster than
before. One would thus be justiﬁed in concluding that the invention of carbon ﬁbre
boats has improved the Action Scheme available to the agent. In the bad, old days
one had to use slow boats made of wood.
The problem is that natural phenomena, such as new islands created by
volcanoes, or storms, or big waves created by a storm, also affect the Action
Scheme available to the sailor. These natural phenomena seem to be at least as
important for what can and cannot be done, and they are at least as unpredictable
and difﬁcult to control as are new technologies. Illies and Meijers believe that there
are important moral differences between technological artefacts and natural
phenomena, but their analysis fails to articulate what those differences consist in.
The same is true of the distinction between old and new technologies: Illies and
Meijers frequently say that new technologies are somehow special from a moral
point of view. But according to the analysis they provide, it seems that in the vast
majority of cases the fundamental difference is between the situations in which you
have access to some technology that solves the problem, no matter whether it is a
new or old technology. For example, if you wish to sail from Syracuse to Athens,
the crucial point would in many cases be whether you have a boat or not, not
whether it is an old or new one.
The Weak Neutrality Thesis
We have argued above that both the Extreme and Moderate Views are implausible.
At the other end of the spectrum we have the Neutrality Thesis, which is dismissed
by Illies and Meijers. The Neutrality Thesis holds that, ‘artefacts are merely neutral
means to the ends agents pursue’.
29 Illies and Meijers argue that the Neutrality
Thesis ‘has little support’ because of the immense effects technological artefacts
28 Ibid., p. 438.
29 Ibid. p. 437.
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30 They claim that ‘[Technological artefacts]
are able to change our relationship to the world in quite fundamental ways and to
introduce potentially serious moral consequences that go beyond those of their
designers’ intentions.’
31
We agree that all these claims about the nature and effects of technological
artefacts are true. It is indeed difﬁcult to imagine what the world would have been
like without mobile phones, nuclear weapons, and sailing boats. Technological
artefacts have a huge impact on our daily lives and on society at large. However, in
our view, this does not sufﬁce for showing that the Neutrality Thesis is false. On the
contrary, we believe that the Neutrality Thesis is by far the most plausible
standpoint in this debate.
In order to explain and defend the Neutrality Thesis it is helpful to distinguish
between two versions of it, which we shall refer to as the Strong and the Weak
Neutrality Thesis, respectively. The Strong Neutrality Thesis holds that technolog-
ical artefacts (i) never ﬁgure as moral agents, and are never (ii) morally responsible
for their effects, and (iii) never affect the moral evaluation of an action. Advocates
of the Weak Neutrality Thesis hold (i) and (ii) to be true, but reject (iii)—on this
view, technological artefacts sometimes affect the moral evaluation of actions. The
difference between the Moderate View and the Weak Neutrality Thesis is that
advocates of the latter position accept a fourth condition that is inconsistent with the
Moderate View: (iv) Actions, unlike sets of actions, are morally right or wrong, or
good or bad.
We accept the Weak Neutrality Thesis but reject the Strong Neutrality Thesis.
Consider, for instance, a terrorist who intends to kill ten million people in a big city
by blowing up a small atomic bomb hidden in a suitcase. Compare the possible world
in which the terrorist presses the red button on his suitcase and the bomb goes off,
with the possible world in which he presses the red button on the suitcase but in
which nothing happens because there was actually no bomb hidden in the suitcase. In
the ﬁrst example ten million people die, but in the second no one is hurt.
Consequentialists, as well as advocates of every minimally plausible version of non-
consequentialism, admit that the action of pressing the button inthe ﬁrst example was
wrong (given certain plausible empirical assumptions), whereas the same need not be
true of the action in the second example. Perhaps the consequences of pressing the
button if there is no bomb in the suitcase would turn out to be fairly good. In fact,
even if both actions are performed with exactly the same intention, and intentions are
much more important than consequences, part (iii) of the Strong View still seems to
come out as false. Anyone who thinks that consequences are of some moral
importance shouldaccept this. (Almostno one, not even contemporarydeontologists,
think that consequences are entirely irrelvant. See e.g. Kamm (2007).)
The bomb example is designed to show that the mere presence of a technological
artefact, viz. a bomb in a suitcase, can affect the moral evaluation of an action. In
the ﬁrst example it is wrong to press the button and right not to press it, but in the
second example it does not matter from a moral point of view (given certain
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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Strong Neutrality Thesis is false. But the truth of the Weak Neutrality Thesis is not
jeopardized.
It might be objected that our example, and perhaps even the formulation of the
Weak and Strong Neutrality Theses, presuppose that inter-situationistic moral
comparisons are possible. This is because we claim that one and the same action can
be right or wrong depending on whether there actually is a bomb in the suitcase, and
as we imagine that the bomb is no longer in the suitcase, the agent is no longer
facing the same situation as before. This seems to render our defence of the Weak
Neutrality Thesis incoherent.
In reply to this objection, we wish to point out that the Weak Neutrality Thesis
can, at the expense of some terminological inconvenience, be restated in a way that
does not require any inter-situationistic moral comparisons. The situation in which
there is a bomb in the suitcase is clearly different from the situation in which there is
no such bomb present. However, the two particular acts we are comparing, pressing-
the-button-in-the-ﬁrst-situation and pressing-the-button-in-the-second-situation are
instances of the same generic action. The Weak Neutrality Thesis can therefore be
restated as a claim about the moral status of generic actions: technological artefacts
(i) never ﬁgure as moral agents, and are never (ii) morally responsible for their
effects, but may sometimes (iii) affect the moral evaluation of generic actions.
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